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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2014.08.006Experience with complex systems more primitive than the brain teaches important lessons about big data in
biology. Chief among them is that physical laws, relationships among measured things that are always true,
emerge out of chaos, not the other way around. Correct prediction (as opposed to incorrect prediction) from
large data sets requires understanding of these laws. The reason is that the same processes that make them
also make the system wildly error-intolerant if the errors are too large. This instability routinely causes com-
puter simulations of even primitive systems to fail by enablingmistakes to cascade into ever worsening false-
hoods. The more complex and sophisticated the system is, the more intolerant to errors it becomes.Thanks largely to the invention of high-
resolution diffusion magnetic resonance
imaging, the era of the connectome is
now upon us, and hopes are high that
it might lead to a better understanding of
the brain, and with luck also of the mind
(Seung, 2012). Wiser heads avoid specu-
lating too much about the latter, for it is
a rather large leap from the brain’s anat-
omy to the brain’s function. (Bargmann
and Marder, 2013) Just how large is
demonstrated by the present state of the
genome (ENCODE Project Consortium,
2012; Graur et al., 2013). We speak
instead about learning more about the
connections themselves and about
advancing medicine (Van Essen and
Ugurbil, 2012). Nonetheless, behind the
pure medical agenda is the natural desire
all of us have to understand ourselves.
Right Answers from Wrong
Equations
The deeper ambitions of physical research
on living things require us to think hard
about where meaning comes from in
experimental science. We are obligated,
in particular, to consider imperfection and
the process of acquiring understanding in
the face of it. This includes both measure-
ment error and the absence of important
information that we cannot yet obtain
because we don’t possess the enabling
technology. The physics version of the
concern is this: how is it ever possible to
get correct answers starting from wrong
equations? The biology version uses
slightly different words but is fundamen-
tally the same: how it is ever possible to
get a correct understanding of somethingstarting from flawed data and computer al-
gorithms that somebody just made up?
Computer programs and the data they
use are synonyms for equations.
Concern about error control is not mere
pedantry, for we know that it is generally
impossible to piece together a correct pic-
ture of a complex system empirically from
inadequate facts. One confronts this real-
ity every day in chemistry and materials
physics, disciplines similar to biology but
dealing with issues that are simpler and
thus easier to identify as problematic.
The poster child of this epistemological
barrier is high-Tc cuprate superconducti-
vity, a matter that has remained unsolved
for almost three decades despite mea-
surement technology vastly more sophis-
ticated than any presently used in life
science (Sebastian et al., 2014). The cor-
responding mass of high-quality data is
comparable to that of the human connec-
tome. The failure is doubly shocking given
the simplicity and experimental relevance
of the underlying equations, which are
known exactly. Much of the (excellent)
theoretical activity has been dedicated to
solving these equations with sufficient ac-
curacy to make good experimental pre-
dictions. The continued failure to achieve
this goal speaks for itself. Physics and
chemistry have had tremendous suc-
cesses too, the digital computer being
one of them, but success has always
involved something beyond big data and
deduction from microscopics.
Emergent Law
The answer to how we can master things
evenwith imperfect experiments is knownNeuron 83, Sepin physical science and codified mathe-
matically in something called the renorm-
alization group (Laughlin, 2005). In short,
nature organizes itself. When it does,
certainmeasuredproperties at long length
and time scales become universal, and
quantitative relationships among them
develop into laws we can then use for en-
gineering. The rigidity and elasticity of all
solids is always the same. The special
properties of insulators, semiconductors,
and metals that allow us to make com-
puters with them are always the same.
The rigid orientation of ferromagnets is al-
ways the same. Emergent universality
causes sample variations and imperfec-
tions to heal away as the size grows, so
they don’t matter to the things one is
measuring. Yet the laws vanish away to
nothingness when one takes the system
apart to see how it works. Compressional
sound is universal in all macroscopic mat-
ter, but compressional sound is a non
sequitur in a small molecule. Supercon-
ducting properties are exact, yet there is
no such thing as a superconducting atom.
Emergent self-organization is a familiar
concept in biology. There is a significant
scientific literature on it, and it has
inspired a body of thoughtful artistic
work, such as that shown in Figure 1.
The physics version is less obvious,
among other reasons because nature
also has laws that don’t emerge but just
are (as far as we know), and we tend to
categorize these as causes of things
rather than consequences of them. How-
ever, emergent physical law exists as
well, and it is exceedingly important.
Without it we would not be able totember 17, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 1253
Figure 1. Physical Law Emerges
Image ª Sayaka Ganz and reproduced here with permission.
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fused environment with infor-
mation from our senses that
is imperfect. We would also
not be able to reliably engi-
neer things to do our bidding.
There are also reasons to
suspect that the mysterious
biological form of emergence
and the simpler physical kind
are related and may even be
one and the same.
Brain Self-Organization
It is perfectly obvious that
something like this is going
on in the brain. All rabbits
run away from foxes, yet a
fertilized rabbit egg contains
no specific antifox gene. The
nervous system invents itselfas it grows, just the way the body itself
does, in ways that are highly predictable
but that we don’t yet understand. The hu-
man genome (and also the rabbit genome)
is only about 3,200 megabase pairs long,
or 800 megabytes in computer parlance.
This small data file encodes every aspect
of the mind—fear, love, hate, jealously,
curiosity, mechanical ability, speech abil-
ity, social ability, creative ability—plus all
the engineering specifics of the body.
The human connectome database, by
contrast, will approach 1 petabyte when
it is completed, or 1.2 million times the
size of the genome (Sporns, 2012). The
statistical principles of information theory
constrain this process like iron (Cover
and Thomas, 2006): a machine that con-
verts the genome logically to the connec-
tome can make such a gargantuan in-
crease in size only if (1) the information
in the connectome ismassively redundant
or (2) details of the connectome are deter-
mined by nongenetic inputs from the envi-
ronment. In other words, noise. The latter
scarcely makes sense if one is trying to
make a rabbit that always runs from foxes.
Decision Instability
Unhappily, emergent universality always
goes hand-in-hand with decision insta-
bility. This relationship is easy to under-
stand. If one changes the instructions for
making a rabbit a little bit, emergent prin-
ciples will guarantee that there is no
effect, and one still get a rabbit. But if
one changes the instructions a lot, one1254 Neuron 83, September 17, 2014 ª2014gets something else, perhaps an ocelot,
although more likely an animal with dis-
ease. The ocelot instructions would like-
wise have a region of stability. Between
this region and the rabbit region there
would necessarily lie at least one bound-
ary where the system became violently
unstable, as it was deciding which of the
two animals to be. At this boundary, arbi-
trarily small perturbations would make
huge, qualitative changes to the outcome.
Emergence in sophisticated things is
therefore a pact with the devil: on the
one hand it gives us tolerance of small er-
rors; on the other it gives us intolerance for
larger ones. We call a system with a huge
number of distinct stable basins of attrac-
tion, and thus global intolerance for error,
complex. By this we simply mean that we
ourselves have trouble anticipating what
the system will do when its parameters
are changed. Complex things, such as
the brain, are ultrasensitive to details by
definition. That’s what it means for them
to be complex!
Experience with decision instability in
the more primitive sciences has been
extremely negative. In the cuprate super-
conductor problem, for example, one
has a dense set of delicately balanced
structural phase transitions involving
both antiferromagnetism and supercon-
ductivity. Samples are difficult to make
clean enough to distinguish the phases
experimentally, measurements are diffi-
cult to perform, and there are reproduc-
ibility issues. The data sets are massive.Elsevier Inc.People fit ever more sophisti-
cated mathematical models
to parts of them (but not to
other parts), declare their
model to be the more insight-
ful truth, and fight over who
has been more clairvoyant.
But in fact the entire modeling
endeavor makes no sense
when one has decision insta-
bility. Models are simply sets
of equations that are wrong.
They have meaning, if at
all, only when they agree
with each other. They do this
only if there is emergent
universality.
The Play Conundrum
The inherent difficulty in tran-
sitioning from anatomy tofunction in the brain is nicely illustrated
by the problem of play (Burghardt,
2005). There is a large behavioral science
literature on play, for it is a fascinating
aspect of the human condition and also
something we have in common with
higher animals. It is also strangely difficult
to define. What exactly is play? What is a
kitten doing when it bats around a yarn
ball? What are turtles doing when they
swim repeatedly through hoops or
bounce balls about with their snouts?
There is a famous quote by Jean Piaget
that play is the answer to how anything
new comes about. In scholarly work one
likes to be as objective as possible, so
one defines play through such things as
activity an animal engages in voluntarily
and repeatedly, and for no apparent pur-
pose. But ultimately we recognize play in
animals because we just do. Playfulness
is something we have in common with
them, and perhaps even with all living
things, even plants (Baluska and Man-
cuso, 2009). Where does play reside in
the brain?
An important clue as to the nature of
play is provided by the observation of
easily recognizable play in the common
octopus (Kuba et al., 2006). The octopus
is a highly advanced and intelligent crea-
ture, so the fact that it does something
we also do is not that surprising at first.
But then one realizes that either (1) play
is emergent behavior so highly beneficial
in natural selection that it evolved sepa-
rately and in great detail in mollusks and
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something highly atavistic, an engineering
principle of life powerfully preserved for at
least 600 million years (Brown, 1998). We
have no common ancestor with the
octopus since before the Cambrian.
Engineering Principle
Thereare twogood reasons to suspect the
engineering explanation of play as being
the right one. One is that nobody can think
of a way that play might have evolved in
machines, such as computers, based on
reason. One can always argue that natural
selection can do anything it likes, but one
prefers to have hypothetical details fill in
when one argues this way, and that has
not happened. By contrast, many people
have thought of ways that natural selec-
tionmight have created logic out of some-
thing else (Cooper, 2004). This is also
roughly consistent with what is known
about early childhood development (For-
man and Kraker, 1985). The other is that
simple chemical reactions can play (Ep-
stein and Showalter, 1996; Ivanov and
Mizuuchi, 2010). As always, categorizing
behavior as play is somewhat in the eye
of the beholder, so a more accurate state-
ment would be that simple reactions can
manifest sophisticated chaotic dynamics,
like those of the weather, in which small
changes in initial conditions make enor-
mous changes in what happens later.
But categorization as play in this case is
also apt because these chaotic chemical
reactions are the intellectual cousins of
cellular automata, extremely simple com-
puter programs that generate a bewil-
dering variety of behaviors that people
tend to recognize as life-like and treat as
games (Adamatzky, 2010).
It is not controversial that neurons do
playful things. They deploy themselves
somewhat haphazardly in glial matter, ex-
hibiting no lateral crystalline order. They
arborize with each other in ways that
resemble tree branches and roots. They
possess on-board memory that responds
to incoming signals in an agent-based
way and changes the signals they them-
selves generate (Kandel, 2001).
What Might Be Missing
If we suspend disbelief for a moment and
consider the possibility that play might bea design principle rather than a higher
emergent phenomenon, a simple idea
presents itself as to why making sense
of the connectome might be so difficult.
The latter includes things like obtaining
the entire map of C. elegans and finding
that it still doesn’t make any sense, and
that it even has no action potentials (Gao
and Zhen, 2011). It is a small step from
systems that play without direction to sys-
tems that play with rules, and from there
to systems that play games with each
other. Were that to happen, it could easily
account for something as complicated as
the brain, for it is well known from the
study of automata that simple systems
playing games can create enormously
complex structures with very sophisti-
cated functions. It is also known that small
changes in the rule base can make enor-
mous changes in the structures that
develop. There is also the obvious
example of the human economy, a thing
that grows out of simple rules of money
exchange that transcends anyone’s
attempt to understand and manage it.
One of the economy’s physical manifesta-
tions is a great network of highways with
mighty cities at its hubs. It would obvi-
ously be a fool’s errand to try understand-
ing the economy by mapping its roads.
There is nothing supernatural or unsci-
entific in the concept of gaming making a
brain, or for that matter an entire organ-
ism. All that is required is an intermediate
stage of organization that is unstable, like
the weather. Physical science tells us that
unstable development can be perfectly
deterministic yet difficult, if not impos-
sible, to follow by experiment, among
other reasons because unstable evolu-
tion is functionally the same thing as
cryptography. Thus the scientific resolu-
tion of the whole mystery might simply
be that the genome instructs the system
to go wild and generate a bag of tools
and parts it might need to construct
something interesting, and then sends a
subsequent instruction to go out and
play. Emergent self-organization then fin-
ishes the job.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I wish to thank W. Bialek, D. Chklovskii, H. Levine,
and P. Mitra for helpful discussions. This work wasNeuron 83, Sepsupported by the National Science Foundation un-
der Grant No. PHY-1338376.REFERENCES
Adamatzky, A. (2010). Game of Life Cellular
Automata. (Heidelberg, Germany: Springer
Verlag).
Baluska, F., and Mancuso, S. (2009). Commun. In-
tegr. Biol. 2, 60–65.
Bargmann, C.I., and Marder, E. (2013). Nat.
Methods 10, 483–490.
Brown, S. (1998). Play as an Organizing Principle:
Clinical Evidence and Personal Observations. In
Animal Play: Evolutionary, Comparative, and
Ecological Perspectives, M. Bekoff and J. Byers,
eds. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press).
Burghardt, G.M. (2005). The Genesis of Animal
Play. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
Cooper, W.S. (2004). The Evolution of Reason:
Logic as a Branch of Biology. (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press).
Cover, T.M., and Thomas, J.A. (2006). Elements of
Information Theory, Second Edition. (New York,
NY: Wiley-Interscience).
ENCODE Project Consortium (2012). Nature 489,
57–74.
Epstein, I.R., and Showalter, K. (1996). J. Phys.
Chem. 100, 13132–13147.
Forman, E.A., and Kraker, M.J. (1985). New Dir.
Child Dev. 29, 23–39.
Gao, S., and Zhen, M. (2011). Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
USA 108, 2557–2562.
Graur, D., Zheng, Y., Price, N., Azevedo, R.B.R.,
Zufall, R.A., and Elhaik, E. (2013). Genome Biol.
Evol. 5, 578–590.
Ivanov, V., and Mizuuchi, K. (2010). Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. USA 107, 8071–8078.
Kandel, E.R. (2001). Science 294, 1030–1038.
Kuba, M.J., Byrne, R.A., Meisel, D.V., and Mather,
J.A. (2006). J. Comp. Psychol. 120, 184–190.
Laughlin, R.B. (2005). A Different Universe. (New
York, NY: Basic Books).
Sebastian, S.E., Harrison, N., Balakirev, F.F., Altar-
awneh, M.M., Goddard, P.A., Liang, R., Bonn,
D.A., Hardy, W.N., and Lonzarich, G.G. (2014).
Nature 511, 61–64.
Seung, S. (2012). Connectome: How the Brain’s
Wiring Makes Us Who We Are. (New York, NY:
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt).
Sporns, O. (2012). Discovering the Human Con-
nectome. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
Van Essen, D.C., and Ugurbil, K. (2012). Neuro-
image 62, 1299–1310.tember 17, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 1255
